if he shaves upon bringing one of the three offerings that a nazirite must bring when completing his term as a nazirite, i.e., a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a peace-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation to shave and the restrictions of a nazirite are lifted, he therefore does not violate the prohibition: You shall not delay, for delaying the other offerings. Consequently, it teaches us that the prohibition against delaying applies to these offerings.

And if you wish say: What is the novelty of the nazirite? The halakha of naziriteship is considered a novelty because the offerings of a nazirite cannot be accepted through a vow. And that which poses a difficulty for you based on the fact that one cannot accept upon himself a sin-offering of forbidden fat through a vow either, and nevertheless the prohibition against delaying applies, can be resolved. A sin-offering of forbidden fat comes for the purpose of atonement, and therefore if one delays bringing it he violates the prohibition against delaying. However, for what does the sin-offering of a nazirite come? Since it does not come to atone for a sin, one might have thought that the prohibition against delaying does not apply.

The Gemara asks: But there is the precedent of the sin-offering of a woman who gave birth, which also does not come for the purpose of atonement, and yet if she does not bring the offering on time she still transgresses due to the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara answers: That sin-offering of a woman who gave birth permits the woman to eat consecrated food. Although it does not come to effect atonement, it does come to permit a matter. On the other hand, the sin-offering of a nazirite does not permit anything, and therefore the fact that one cannot accept upon himself an obligation to bring this offering is a novelty. Consequently, it was necessary for there to be a separate source to indicate that one is liable for violating the prohibition against delaying in the case of this offering.

§ The Master said in the baraita cited above: Just as with regard to vows, a father may nullify the vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the vows of his wife, so too, with regard to nazirite vows, a father may nullify the nazirite vows of his daughter and a husband may nullify the nazirite vows of his wife. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the juxtaposition in the verse to teach us this halakha? Let this halakha come through the method of analogy known as: What do we find, from the halakha with regard to vows. In other words, the halakha in the case of regular vows should serve as a legal precedent that can be applied to nazirite vows even without a biblical juxtaposition.

The Gemara responds: If not for the juxtaposition, one might have said that perhaps it is only with regard to vows that he may nullify her statements because there is no time limit with regard to vows, but with regard to naziriteship, which has a time limit, as unspecified naziriteship is for thirty days, one might say no, he may not nullify her vows. Therefore, it teaches us through juxtaposition that he may nevertheless nullify her vows.

§ It is taught in the mishna with regard to one who says to his fellow: I am avowed from you, or another intimation of a vow, that the vow takes effect. Shmuel said: In all these cases, the vow does not take effect until he says: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours. Without this addition, the statement: I am avowed from you, is not considered even an intimation of a vow.

The Gemara raises an objection based on the following baraita: If one says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is prohibited from benefiting from that individual. If he says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food. This indicates that the phrases mentioned in the first clause of the baraita take effect as vows even if he does not add the phrases mentioned in the latter clause. The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is teaching: In what case is this statement said i.e., if one says: I am avowed from you, or the like, the vow takes effect? It is in a case of one who says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the opposite order? If one says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited from eating or tasting that individual’s food, i.e., the vow takes effect. If he says: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, he is likewise prohibited. In this case, the baraita cannot be interpreted as explained above, and it appears that if one said: I am avowed from you, the vow takes effect even if he did not say: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I taste of yours. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as follows: The vow takes effect in the cases mentioned in the first clause when he already said: I am avowed.

The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the first baraita cited above. And furthermore, if the vow takes effect only if he combined the statements mentioned in the first and latter clauses of the baraita, why does the baraita teach that he is prohibited in the first clause of the baraita and then repeat that he is prohibited in the second clause of the baraita? The repetition of this ruling indicates that these are two separate cases.

Rather, Shmuel actually said as follows: The reason is that he said: I am avowed from you with regard to that which I eat of yours, or with regard to that which I taste of yours; it is for this reason that he is prohibited from benefiting from his fellow, and his fellow is permitted to benefit from him, as this formulation indicates that he is applying his vow only to himself.